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ABSTRACT
With growing demands for commercial nuclear power, there is also a growing need for
better energy efficiency from nuclear power reactors. In order to reach a high burnup up
to 100 MWd/kg, previous research has examined the use of thorium-plutonium mixed-
oxide fuel as a potential candidate for this high-burnup goal. Though the neutronics
studies have looked upon this fuel type favorably, the purpose of this paper is to
investigate the self-protection capabilities of this fuel type, for anti-proliferation
purposes. In particular, there were two proliferation-resistance methods that were
analyzed. First, this study examined the time-dependant dose-rate of the spent fuel caused
by the decay of the isotope uaranium-232, which releases a high-energy gamma of 2.6
MeV. Next, this study examined the possibility of denaturing the fuel with depleted
uranium in order to dilute the weapons-usable isotope uranium-233 in the spent fuel. The
U-232 dose rate was also calculated for the denatured case. Ultimately, the study found
that there was a negligible different in the amount of time that it takes for either fuel type
to become self-protective. The denatured case showed that it requires much more
plutonium than the undenatured case in order to ensure that there is not sufficient
weapons-usable U-233 in the discharged fuel.
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1. Introduction
On July 1, 1968, a collection of nations came together to sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, otherwise known as NPT. The treaty came in response to a division
between those nations who were building nuclear weapons, and those who were not. The
Nuclear Weapons States were actually more supportive of peaceful nuclear technology
and actively executed more research for this purpose. Therefore, the treaty was created in
order to allow the rest of the world to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology while the
Nuclear Weapons States could protect their right to weapons possession. Furthermore,
the treaty allowed the Non-Nuclear Weapons States to have access to nuclear power so
long as they promised to not develop their own weapons. Lastly, the treaty led to the
creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to regulate this agreement
made by the collection of nations participating.
However, the International Atomic Energy Agency has warned of the black
market that exists for gas centrifuges and nuclear fuel. This black market is thought to
exist in many countries including Pakistan, Malaysia, Iran, and North Korea-all
countries known to have possession of nuclear explosives. Therefore, the possibility of
enriched uranium falling into the wrong hands is definitely a possibility, so nuclear power
regulations must be imposed to account for that threat. One such regulation is the
limitation of uranium enrichment to very low levels, with 20% being the maximum
weight percentage allowed for any reactor type. The present de facto limit for all power
reactors is 5%. However, with growing demands for nuclear energy also comes a
growing need for better energy efficiency from commercial power reactors. In other
words, there is a need for higher enrichment of fissile material (for higher burnup) in
order to extract more energy from the fuel, and achieve longer fuel cycles as well as less
frequent refueling.
Some light water reactors (LWRs) today use a uranium-plutonium mixed-oxide
(MOX) fuel for power generation. This mixed fuel was used to replace the conventional
uranium-dioxide (U0 2) because of the large amounts of plutonium available from spent
nuclear fuel. Previous research has demonstrated, however, that if this uranium-
plutonium mixed-oxide fuel were enriched with fissile material to higher levels then it
would create a positive void coefficient in the reactor. Currently, the limit for enrichment
of plutonium in MOX fuel is about 12% for this reason. A positive void coefficient is
undesirable for operation purposes because it means that that the reactivity increases as
the void content inside the reactor increases due to increased boiling or loss of coolant.
Therefore, a better option was introduced by replacing the uranium with thorium in the
mixed-oxide fuel in order to eliminate this positive void coefficient concern in reaching
higher burnup levels.
Furthermore, the replacement of uranium with thorium is desirable for other
reasons. First, it addressed the concern that uranium reserves would start to diminish in
the coming years. Second, the use of thorium proved to be more efficient at depleting
plutonium in the MOX fuel. This was important because plutonium was considered the
most significant threat for nuclear proliferation, so it was necessary to find ways to
decrease the overall mass of plutonium and not produce any significant amounts of
additional plutonium (which the uranium in the MOX fuel actually was doing). For
example, a study showed that the uranium-plutonium MOX can deplete about 544 kg of
plutonium per year, while the thorium-plutonium can deplete about 800 kg of plutonium
per year [1]. Lastly, the thorium-plutonium MOX fuel produced a transmutation chain
product, uranium-232, which emits a very high-energy gamma ray. This meant that the
fuel would be self-protecting by making it more vulnerable to radiation detection
methods as well as more difficult to handle (from a radiation safety standpoint).
2. Statement of Problem
2.1 Background Information
Present day discharge burnups for UOX fuel are about 50 MWD/kg. In trying to
reach high burnup up to 100 MW-day/kg, there are three major obstacles: the positive-
void coefficient when using a uranium-plutonium MOX fuel, temperature restraints in the
fuel bundle cladding material, and most importantly the proliferation concern of
producing weapons-usable fissile material. As stated above, the issue with the positive-
void coefficient has already been addressed by the replacement of uranium with thorium
in the MOX fuel. A recent study analyzed various reactivity coefficients such as
moderator temperature coefficient, Doppler coefficient, void coefficient, and soluble
boron worth for MOX fuel and for thorium-plutonium fuel. The conclusion was that the
thorium-plutonium fuel was more advantageous because it had a negative Doppler
coefficient and moderator temperature coefficient [2].
The next obstacle involving the cladding material is due to the current material
used in commercial nuclear power plants, zirconium alloy. A previous study has
investigated the use of thorium-plutonium fuel, but only up to a burnup level of 60
MWd/kg. This was because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has set a regulation
limiting LWR burnup at 62 MWd/kg due to this cladding issue. After withstanding a
burnup of 62 MWd/kg, the ductility of the zirconium alloy cladding is reduced by a factor
of five [3]. This happens because as temperature of the reactor increases, the fuel pellet
and cladding both experience thermal expansion while there is also a continual buildup of
fission product gases increasing the pressure between the fuel and the cladding. This
buildup of pressure imposes heavy strain on the clad material and also leads to the
buildup of an oxide layer making the zirconium alloy more brittle. Finally, the diffusion
of hydrogen into this gap creates zirconium hydride (ZrH2), which makes the cladding
even more brittle and more likely to crack under transient situations [3].
Current research, however, is trying to address this concern by introducing a new
type of cladding material called Silicon Carbide (SiC). The idea is that this cladding
might be more suitable for reaching higher burnup because it is a ceramic material. The
fuel is not allowed to come into contact with the cladding because it is brittle material, so
a wider gap is needed. Therefore, the larger gap thickness will allow the fuel to reach
higher temperatures. Additionally, the thermal conductivity of silicon carbide is lower
than zirconium alloy; thus, the buildup of fission gases will be able to diffuse more
efficiently [4]. Previous research has shown that silicon carbide has the potential of being
able to withstand burnup levels up to 100 MWd/kg without damage to the cladding or the
fuel.
Finally, the last concern in reaching high burnup levels is regarding the issue of
proliferation threat in producing fissile material. Typically, weapons are made using
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-239 as the primary fuel. Highly-enriched-
uranium must be enriched above 20% in order to be weapons-usable, which is partly the
reason why it is currently the upper enrichment limit for research reactors. Plutonium-239
does not exist in nature because it is only produced in reactors by neutron absorption in
U-238 (with subsequent beta decay). In the proposed thorium-plutonium MOX fuel
cycle, however, there is a third fissile isotope that can pose a significant risk: uranium-
233. It is produced from the neutron absorption of thorium-232, which is the main fertile
isotope in this fuel type. These three isotopes-U-235, Pu-239, and U-233-are all
potential proliferation risks because they all have large thermal-neutron fission cross-
sections. Therefore, if any of these three isotopes were to fall into the wrong hands, it
could lead to serious illegal weapons fabrication. The purpose of this report is to examine
two particular methods of making this thorium-plutonium fuel self-protective against
attempts at illegal activity for weapons purposes.
2.2 Uranium-232 and Dilution of Uranium-233
The first proposed form of self-protection involves the presence of the isotope
uranium-232 in the spent fuel-a product of a high-energy (n, 2n) reaction in uranium-
233. This uranium isotope is significant because it releases a very powerful gamma ray of
energy 2.6 MeV from the decay of thallium-208, a daughter product in the decay of U-
232 [5]. Figure 1 illustrates the decay chain of U-232 along with the half-life of all the
subsequent radioisotopes, ending with the stable isotope lead-208.
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Figure 1. Decay Chain of Uranium-232
This powerful gamma emission is very important for two reasons. First, this makes the
fuel very easy to detect with radiation security equipment. Second, this kind of ionizing
radiation can make it very difficult to handle such material. In trying to build a nuclear
weapon, the process requires the chemical separation of the fissile material U-233 from
the rest of the MOX fuel. But with the U-232 isotope present, it would be very difficult to
extract the material due to the high-energy penetrating gamma rays emitted from the
fissile material.
The next proposed form of self-protection involves the denaturing of the thorium-
plutonium fuel using depleted uranium in order to dilute the weapons-usable isotope U-
233. According to one particular study, the discharged fuel is considered non-weapons
usable so long as the proliferation index is less than 0.12 [6]. This is defined as:
Weight of 2U31 + 0.6 X Weight of 35U
Total Weight of Uranium (1)
By denaturing the thorium-plutonium fuel with a small admixture of depleted uranium
(0.25% enriched), the amount of weapons-usable U-233 will be depleted to low amounts
therefore rendering the discharged fuel resistant to proliferation attempts. For the
purposes of this study, depleted uranium was chosen over natural uranium because of
availability and also because of cost.
2.3 Goals
In order to present deliverables with concrete analysis, the following is a list of
the main tasks investigated in this study:
1. Uranium-232 dose rate in un-denatured fuel- In order to quantify the degree
to which uranium-232 is making the undenatured fuel self-protective, the
maximum dose rate will be calculated in units of rem/hour. This number will be
important in understanding the radiological properties of highly enriched
thorium-plutonium MOX fuel used to reach a discharge burnup of 100 MWd/kg.
2. Thorium, Plutonium, Uranium concentrations- In determining the initial
concentrations of each individual heavy metal, there are two boundary conditions
that must be met: a discharge burnup of 1 OOMWd/kg, and a proliferation index
approximately under 0.12.
3. Uranium-232 dose rate in denatured fuel- Though already self-protected in
theory, the dose rate from U-232 in the denatured fuel will also be calculated.
This will be compared to the dose rate of the un-denatured case in order to see the
effect that the uranium admixture has on the production of U-232 in the
discharged fuel.
2.4 Benchmarks
Before making any calculations, there are a couple of benchmarks that must be
established in order to make accurate comparisons further in the study. First, before
analyzing the initial composition of the heavy metals in the thorium-plutonium-uranium
MOX fuel for reaching higher burnup levels, there needs to be a benchmark for the initial
composition of uranium dioxide in conventional power operation. In other words, the U-
235 enrichment will reach higher levels than usual for burnup levels up to 100 MWd/kg.
Figure 2 shows how the enrichment of uranium dioxide follows the linear reactivity
model for discharge burnup.
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Figure 2. The Linear Reactivity Model of Uranium Dioxide Fuel.
Assuming a leakage reactivity of 3%, the U-235 enrichment for discharge burnups of
50MWd/kg, 75 MWd/kg, and 100 MWd/kg were calculated to be 4.3 9%, 6.625%, and
9.06%, respectively.
Next, a benchmark is needed for the initial concentration of the heavy metals in
undenatured thorium-plutonium MOX fuel when reaching high discharge burnup. Figure
3 shows the linear reactivity behavior of the fuel for a single-batch burnup of up to 75
MWd/kg. The figure is originally from a study comparing conventional MOX fuel to
thorium-plutonium MOX fuel [7]. By extrapolation, the plutonium enrichment for
discharge bumup levels of 50 MWd/kg, 75 MWd/kg, and 100 MWd/kg are
approximately 9%, 13%, and 17%.
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Figure 3. Linear Reactivity Model for MOX and Th-RGPu [7].
3. Procedures
3.1 Calculating Dose Rate of Discharged Undenatured Fuel
The first step in calculating the dose rate was determining the composition of the
fuel at the discharge burnup of 100 MWd/kg. This was done using the simulation code
CASMO-a two-dimensional, multi-group transport code that is used for simulations of
BWR/PWR assemblies or pin cells. It relies on 70 energy groups to calculate all the
neutronics parameters in the simulations, using an internal library called JEFF-2.2 [8].
For the purposes of this study, only one pin cell was used for the simulations. The
geometry and operating conditions of a typical PWR pin cell are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Typical Operation Conditions of PWR Pin Cell
Fuel Temperature [K] 900
Coolant Temperature [K] 583.1
Operating Pressure [MPa] 15.5
Core Power Density [kW/L] 104.5
Fuel Pellet Diameter [mm] 8.192
Gap Thickness [mm] 0.082
Fuel Cladding Outer Diameter [mm] 9.500
Fuel Element Pitch [mm] 12.6
A visual image of the pin cell is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Geometric schematic of PWR pin cell.
As stated in section 2.4, the plutonium enrichment for the undenatured case
achieving a discharge burnup of 100 MWd/kg was determined to be 16.3%, with the rest
of the initial heavy metal composed of thorium-oxide (83.7%). In running CASMO for
this case, the theoretical densities of plutonium oxide (PuO 2) and thorium oxide (ThO 2)
were assumed to be 11 g/cm 3 and 9.6 g/cm 3, respectively, with a total averaged
theoretical density of 9.8 g/cm 3 [9]. However, only 96% of this theoretical density was
used as the input density for the simulation. For the composition of the ThO2, only the
Th-232 isotope was used. For PuO 2, however, the composition is listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Isotopic Composition of Plutonium
Nucide Weight Percent
Pu-238 2%
Pu-239 53%
Pu-240 25%
Pu-241 15%
Pu-242 5%
After running the simulation to a burnup of 100 MWd/kg, the final isotopic
composition of the fuel was extracted. In particular, the weight percentage of U-233 in
the discharged fuel was recorded for further calculation. An important assumption used
was that the total weight of one fuel assembly was 450 kg of heavy metal mass.
Therefore, the total weight of U-233 at the discharge burnup was calculated by
multiplying the weight percentage of U-233 by the total heavy metal mass of 450 kg, and
then reduced by a factor of two to account for discrepancies in U-232 distribution in a
fuel rod. According to a recent study, the ratio of U-232 production to U-233 production
in a typical PWR is approximately 7.267x10-3 [10]. From this ratio, the total initial
weight of the isotope U-232 was deduced.
Next, figure 5 shows the total dose rate for 1 gram of U-232 as a function of time.
The dose rate continues to grow until it reaches a peak at around 9 years of decay, with a
maximum dose rate of about 21 rem/hour per gram of U-232 initial.
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Figure 5. Dose Rate for 1 gram of U-232 initial [10].
To calculate the peak dose rate for discharged undenatured thorium-plutonium MOX
fuel, the total initial weight of U-232 was multiplied by this peak value of 21 rem/hour
per gram of U-232 initial.
3.2 Calculating the Concentrations of Plutonium, Uranium, Thorium
As stated in section 2.3, there were two main boundary conditions in calculating
the concentrations of the heavy metals used in the denatured case: a discharge burnup of
100 MWd/kg, and a Proliferation Index approximately equal to but less than 0.12. In
running CASMO for this case, the theoretical densities of PuO2, ThO2, and U0 2 were
assumed to be 11 g/cm 3, 9.6 g/cm 3, and 10.5 g/ cm3, respectively, with a total averaged
theoretical density of 9.98 g/cm 3. Again, only 96% of this theoretical density was used as
the actual density in the input. The discharge burnup is defined as,
2n (2)BU, = BUl,
Assuming a fuel cycle with n=3 batches, the discharge burnup becomes 1.5 * BU 1 .
Through trial and error in adjusting the amount of plutonium and depleted
uranium used in the CASMO simulation, the aim was to find a combination that achieved
a single-batch burnup close to 66.67 MWd/kg, implying a discharge burnup of 100
MWd/kg according to equation 3. The single-batch burnup is defined as the equilibrium
burnup where the reactor remains critical. In other words, it is the burnup at which kimf is
at a value of 1.03 (the 0.03 accounts for the leakage reactivity worth). After finding a
right match, the fuel composition was extracted from the discharged fuel in order to
verify the proliferation index using equation 1.
3.3 Calculating Dose Rate of Discharged Denatured Fuel
This step was very similar to the process used to calculate the dose rate for the
discharged undenatured fuel described in section 3.1. Using the fuel composition found in
section 3.2, the weight percentage of U-233 was recorded and used to calculate the total
initial weight of U-232 (using the same assumption that the total heavy metal mass was
originally 450 kg). To calculate the peak dose rate for discharged denatured thorium-
plutonium MOX fuel, the total initial weight of U-232 was multiplied by the peak value
of 21 rem/hour per gram of U-232 initial. Next, the total time to become self-protective
was calculated for both fuel types. This was done by examining the amount of time
(based on the correlations described above) that it took to reach a dose rate of 100
rem/hour, which is the minimum dose-rate needed for self-protection.
4. Results
4.1 Uranium-232 dose rate in undenatured fuel
At the end of its life cycle, the undenatured fuel contains a total weight percent of
1.973% of the fissile isotope U-233. Assuming a total heavy metal mass of 450 kg, this
results in a total mass of 8.87 kg of U-233. After multiplying this number by the U-
232/U-233 ratio and reducing by a factor of two, the resulting weight of uranium-232 in
the discharged fuel is approximately 32.26 grams. Using the correlation illustrated in
figure 5, the peak dose rate from U-232 in spent thorium-plutonium MOX fuel is
approximately 677.46 rem/hour, for a radius of 1 meter after a time span of 9 years. This
is well above the 100 rem/hour self-protection standard needed for resistance to
proliferation.
4.2 Thorium, Plutonium, Depleted Uranium Concentrations
Figure 6 shows how the value of kinf changes with increasing burnup for both the
denatured and undenatured case. For both cases, the value of the neutron multiplication
factor is equal to 1.03 at the point where the single-batch burnup is equal to 66 MWd/kg.
Interestingly enough, the curves intersect at the point where kin= 1.03, with the denatured
case having a lower slope than the denatured case. This is probably due to the fact that
the admixture of uranium makes it more efficient at breeding fissile material, since the U-
238 in the material keeps interacting with neutrons and producing additional Pu-239 in
the fuel.
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Figure 6. Undenatured versus Denatured.
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Table 3 shows the composition of both fuel types in addition to the proliferation
index of the denatured case. The proliferation index does not apply to the undenatured
case because it is only used for cases where U-233 is isotopically diluted with U-238. In
order to maintain the proliferation index for the denatured case under 0.12, it requires a
significant amount of more plutonium than the undenatured case.
Table 3. Isotopic Composition of Both Fuel Types
- -. - - - --. ... .. ... .. .
.......... ... -........
4.3 Uranium-232 Dose Rate in Denatured Case
At the end of its life cycle, the denatured fuel contains a total weight percentage
of 1.741% of U-233, less than the amount in the undenatured case. Assuming a total
heavy metal mass of 450 kg, this results in a total mass of 7.83 kg of U-233. After
multiplying this number by the U-232/U-233 ratio and reducing by a factor of two, the
resulting weight of uranium-232 in the discharged fuel is approximately 28.47 grams.
Using the correlation illustrated in figure 5, the peak dose rate from U-232 in spent
denatured fuel is approximately 597.8 rem/hour, for a radius of 1 meter after a time span
of 9 years. This dose rate is also well above the 100 rem/hour self-protection standard
needed for resistance to proliferation. Therefore, both the denatured case and undenatured
case demonstrate a fair ability to resist proliferation attempts simply by the presence of
the high-energy gamma from uranium-232.
Using the same correlation from figure 5, table 4 shows the amount of time that it
takes for both cases to become self-protective assuming the initial U-232 amount
described above. A fuel bundle is considered self-protective if the total measured dose
rate is above 100 rem/hour per gram of U-232 initial.
Table 4. Beginning of Self-Protection
U-232 Initial Beginning of Self-Protection
Undenatured 32.26 grams 21 weeks
Denatured 28.47 grams 26 weeks
As expected, the addition of depleted uranium causes the dilution of weapons-
usable U-233, therefore reducing the amount of U-232 present in the spent fuel. This, in
turn, means that it takes longer for the denatured fuel type to become self-protective.
However, it is only a matter of 5 weeks difference.
5. Conclusions
5.1 Discussion
The study presented in this report demonstrated that thorium-plutonium mixed-
oxide fuel denatured with depleted uranium could very well be a viable alternative to
conventional power reactor fuel limited to 5% enrichment. In trying to reach a high
burnup of 100 MWd/kg, there are three main obstacles for the typical uranium-plutonium
mixed oxide fuel. First, there is the problem caused by positive void coefficient in the
fuel. This was easily solved by replacing the uranium with thorium as the main fertile
fuel. Second, the cladding made of zirconium alloy can only withstand burnup up to 62
MWd/kg. Therefore, an initiative was created with the aim to find a cladding replacement
that can withstand higher temperatures. A number of studies at MIT have focused on
silicon carbide as a possible candidate for this new cladding. Finally, there is the issue
regarding proliferation concern and making the spent fuel resistant to proliferation
threats.
This study has shown that the undenatured case and the denatured case both
demonstrate a substantial ability to be self-protective by the presence of strong gamma
emissions from the decay of U-232. Because the depleted uranium helps dilute the
amount of U-233 in the denatured case, the peak dose rate is lower than that of the
undenatured case. Therefore, it takes about five more weeks for the denatured fuel to
become self-protective. In the larger scheme of illegal activity, however, this is a
relatively small difference in time given that it takes months to transport the spent fuel
and proceed to chemically separate the isotopes. Therefore, both the undenatured and
denatured cases have demonstrated the ability to resist proliferation attempts solely based
on the high dose-rate and easy detectability.
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research
When it comes to choosing between an undenatured fuel type and a denatured
fuel type, the question really comes down to the economics. Table 3 shows that the
denatured fuel requires a much heavier concentration of plutonium in the fuel than the
undenatured fuel (for a discharge burnup of 100 MWd/kg). A future project could
investigate the economic implications of requiring more plutonium while also using
uranium to dilute the weapons-usable isotope U-233. Ultimately, both cases are self-
protective so there might be no need to dilute the fissile material. However, given that
there is still a time window when then the fuel is not self-protective (approximately 21
weeks), then it might be more logical to use the denatured fuel type in order to ensure
absolute security of the fuel. At the same time, this hypothetical study could also examine
the trade-offs in using depleted uranium versus natural uranium to dilute the weapons-
usable material. For example, depleted uranium might be more available and less costly;
however, the use of natural uranium would allow for less use of plutonium and would aid
in reducing the amount of capital costs in extracting plutonium from spent fuel.
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